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INTRODUCTION 
The Heller and McDonald decisions rendered certain gun control 
measures unconstitutional.  This Article discusses the kinds of gun 
control that still may be constitutionally permissible in light of those 
decisions.  It also analyzes which kinds of gun control are effective, 
first reviewing evidence on the fundamental underlying issue of 
whether gun ownership levels affect violence rates.  This Article then 
outlines the major forms that gun control efforts have taken and 
critically reviews the research evidence concerning the impact of gun 
control measures on crime.  Finally, the Conclusion outlines the types 
of constitutionally permissible gun control policies that should be 
implemented to reduce crime. 
I.  WHAT CANNOT BE DONE: CONSTITUTIONALLY 
IMPERMISSIBLE GUN CONTROL 
In District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
the Supreme Court established that the Second Amendment protects 
an individual’s right to own a gun for personal use and that neither 
the federal government nor state or local governments can abridge 
this right.1  More specifically, the Court ruled that there is a 
constitutional right to keep a loaded handgun at home for self-
defense.2  Thus, it seems clear that governments may not completely 
forbid the ownership of handguns, or of all guns, or require that all 
guns kept in the home remain unloaded. 
 
 1. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29.  
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II.  WHAT MAY STILL BE PERMISSIBLE 
Beyond these limitations, it remains unclear what other gun control 
measures, if any, are now constitutionally impermissible.  Because the 
decisions explicitly addressed the possession of guns in the home, it 
remains possible that governments could completely forbid the 
possession of firearms outside the home.  Possession in the home can 
be restricted in a variety of ways short of total prohibition.  For 
example, after the McDonald decision struck down Chicago’s 
handgun ban, the city of Chicago quickly responded by implementing 
a revised ordinance that forbade keeping more than one handgun 
assembled and operable in the home.3 
Likewise, the Court did not explicitly forbid the enactment of laws 
establishing restrictive firearms licensing laws and ordinances.  New 
York City requires residents to have a pistol permit to own a handgun 
legally, but the law is administered so stringently that virtually no 
residents of New York City other than retired police officers are able 
to get a permit.4  It costs $431.50 just to apply for a handgun license 
(including fingerprinting charges), the fees are nonrefundable, and 
the odds are stacked heavily against the application being approved.5  
For example, in 1987, only twenty-one percent of applications were 
approved.6  Applicants may be denied if they had a moving violation 
in their driving history, failed to get fingerprinted, or failed to provide 
all the voluminous paperwork and documentation required.7  The 
application must include two color photographs of specified size, a 
birth certificate, proof of current address, a letter of necessity, and for 
some applicants, copies of the applicant’s business sales tax report, a 
 
 3. See CHI., ILL. CODE § 8-20-040 (2010). 
 4. See Jarrett Murphy, Are New York City’s Gun Laws the Next Target?, CITY 
LIMITS (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.citylimits.org/news/articles/4618/are-new-york-
city-s-gun-laws-the-next-target.  
 5. See POLICE DEP’T CITY OF N.Y., INSTRUCTIONS TO HANDGUN LICENSE 
APPLICANTS (2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/ 
permits/HandGunLicenseApplicationFormsComplete.pdf.  
 6. Bethany Kandel, Goetz Sentenced in Gun Case Today, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 
1987, at 3A. 
 7. See POLICE DEP’T CITY OF N.Y., supra note 5.  This document includes a 
detailed five-page application form and eleven more pages of supplementary forms 
and instructions, including forms in which the applicant swears that he is familiar with 
all local, state, and federal laws and regulations related to handgun possession, which 
must be signed and notarized. See POLICE DEP’T CITY OF N.Y., HANDGUN LICENSE 
APPLICATION (2010), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/ 
permits/HandGunLicenseApplicationFormsComplete.pdf. 
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personal income tax return, daily bank deposit slips, and a variety of 
bank statements.8 
In short, it is so difficult to own a handgun in New York City 
legally that less than one percent of New York City residents have 
obtained the license authorizing them to possess a handgun.9  The 
burden of proof under New York City law is on the would-be 
handgun owner to show high moral character and a special need for a 
handgun.10  Few are able to meet that burden.  The New York City 
law therefore appears to function effectively as a de facto ban on 
handgun possession even though it is not written explicitly as a ban.  
It remains to be seen whether this sort of semi-ban is constitutionally 
impermissible, but if New York City’s gun laws are constitutional, it is 
unlikely that any existing gun laws, or any but the tiniest share of 
politically achievable future gun control measures, would be ruled 
unconstitutional. 
The actual impact of Heller and McDonald on gun control 
restriction in America may well turn out to be negligible.  No other 
large cities besides Washington, D.C. and Chicago—and no states—
have enacted outright bans on private possession of handguns or of 
guns in general.11  There are no signs that any would have done so in 
the foreseeable future if Heller and McDonald had been decided 
differently.  If this pair of decisions only forbids outright bans, and 
later decisions do not significantly increase the scope of measures 
considered to be unconstitutional, it is unlikely that many significant 
existing gun control measures would be taken off the books.  In sum, 
it is not clear that any further gun laws will be struck down (beyond 
the handful of local gun bans in those small towns in Illinois) or that 
any politically achievable gun control proposals will have to be 
withdrawn due to constitutional concerns as a result of Heller and 
McDonald.  Furthermore, it may not be politically feasible to enact 
outright gun bans in the foreseeable future.  Only twenty-six percent 
of U.S. adults supported banning the private possession of handguns 
in an October 2011 national survey.12  Thus, if Heller and McDonald 
forbid only outright gun bans, they will neither preclude enactment of 
 
 8. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 9. See Murphy, supra note 4.   
 10. See supra note 4.  
 11. See D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01 (2012); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/1 (2012). 
 12. See Guns, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2012); see also Jeffrey M. Jones, Record-Low 26% in U.S. Favor Handgun 
Ban, GALLUP (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150341/Record-Low-Favor-
Handgun-Ban.aspx.    
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any new gun laws that would otherwise have been politically 
achievable nor require the repeal or revision of any significant 
existing gun laws beyond the two they have already negated.13 
On the other hand, it is possible that the scope of what is 
considered unconstitutional may be expanded in the future as the 
Court extends or elaborates on Heller and McDonald, especially if 
the composition of the Court changes in a conservative, pro-gun 
direction.  Thus, it is worth thinking about whether anything 
significant in the way of crime control and violence prevention would 
be lost if any existing gun control laws were struck down.  What does 
existing research have to say about the effectiveness of gun laws?  If 
they are ineffective, no crime control would be lost by expanded 
interpretations of the protections of the Second Amendment, no 
matter how extensive the protections might prove to be. 
III.  DO GUN LEVELS AFFECT VIOLENCE? 
A more fundamental preliminary question, however, is whether 
gun availability actually increases crime and violence.  If it does not, 
there is little utilitarian justification for gun control.  While many gun 
control advocates undoubtedly favor stricter gun laws for non-
utilitarian reasons, such as a cultural antipathy towards gun owners,14 
few openly rest their case for controls on these grounds.15  If gun 
availability does affect the rates or seriousness of crime and violence, 
then laws that are effective in reducing gun availability may reduce 
rates of violence. 
Most studies of the impact of gun ownership levels on rates of 
crime and violence are fatally flawed.16  Nearly all of them make at 
least one, but usually all of the three critical errors: (1) they use 
invalid measures of gun ownership levels; (2) they fail to make any 
serious effort to control for the effects on crime of other factors 
correlated with gun ownership (“confounding factors”); or (3) they 
fail to distinguish the effect of gun levels on crime rates from the 
 
 13. For examples of the gun laws that were not subject to repeal, see sources cited 
supra note 11. 
 14. See Gary Kleck et al., Why Do People Support Gun Control?: Alternative 
Explanations of Support for Handgun Bans, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 496, 497–98 (2009) 
[hereinafter Kleck et al., Why do People Support Gun Control?]. 
 15. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, LEGAL ACTION 
PROJECT LITIGATION DOCKET (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.bradycenter.org/ 
xshare/pdf/lap/cases/currentdocket.pdf. 
 16. See Gary Kleck, How Not to Study the Effect of Gun Levels on Violence 
Rates, 21 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 65, 65-93 (2009).  
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effect of crime rates on gun ownership.17  Only three studies have 
avoided these three problems, and all found there was no net crime-
increasing effect on gun ownership levels.18 
Thus, the overall rate of gun ownership in the population as a 
whole has no net effect on crime rates, including homicide rates.19  
Consequently, even if gun control measures could reduce general gun 
ownership levels, there is no sound reason to believe this would cause 
a reduction in crime rates.  On the other hand, gun control measures 
might reduce gun levels within some high-risk subsets of the 
population, such as convicted criminals.  Indeed, few gun control 
measures are intended to reduce overall gun levels.20  In fact, they 
might reduce crime in other ways that do not require reducing gun 
ownership levels, such as reducing the availability of guns in public 
places or deterring criminal use of guns through harsh penalties.21  
Thus, some gun control interventions might still be effective even 
though higher overall gun levels do not increase crime. 
In the review that follows, the conclusions I draw are based on the 
findings of the methodologically strongest research done on each gun-
related intervention.  They are not based on crude “vote counting” to 
determine the most frequent findings.  This is a crucial distinction 
because the vast majority of research in this area is, like the research 
on the effect of gun levels on crime rates, fatally flawed and the 
findings of most studies therefore can be given little weight.22  Making 
matters worse, most research published in medical and public health 
journals is not only technically primitive, but also shows distinct signs 
 
 17. See id. 
 18. See Gary Kleck & E. Britt Patterson, The Impact of Gun Control and Gun 
Ownership Levels on Violence Rates, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 239 (1993) 
[hereinafter Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates]; Tomislav Kovandzic, Mark 
Schaffer, & Gary Kleck, Gun Prevalence, Homicide Rates and Causality: A GMM 
Approach to Endogeneity Bias, THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGICAL 
RESEARCH METHODS 76-92 (David Gadd, Susanne Karstedt, & Steven F. Messner 
eds., 2012); Tomislav Kovandzic, Mark Schaffer, & Gary Kleck, Estimating the 
Causal Effect of Gun Prevalence on Homicide Rates: A Local Average Treatment 
Effect Approach, 28 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming Sept. 2013).  
 19. See Kleck et al., Why Do People Support Gun Control?, supra note 14, at 502. 
See generally GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 
(1997) [hereinafter KLECK, TARGETING GUNS]. 
 20. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19. 
 21. See id. at 366. 
 22. For a discussion of examples of fatally flawed research, see infra Part V.  
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of ideological bias.23  In practice, this means one technically sound study 
can outweigh a dozen fatally flawed studies.  The conclusions of this 
Article are based on the studies that, though typically few in number, 
most closely hewed to the methods prescribed in research methods 
textbooks. 
IV.  FORMS OF GUN CONTROL 
Gun control can take many forms and is not limited to laws and 
ordinances.  Indeed, most efforts to limit gun ownership in recent 
decades have not been aimed at creating new legislation.24  As state 
and local governments increasingly have become dominated by 
Republicans and conservative Democrats, prospects for gaining 
stricter gun laws have become dimmer and gun control advocates 
have sought other avenues for limiting guns that did not require the 
support of legislative majorities.25  Before discussing gun control laws, 
it is worth reviewing some of the other methods of gun control. 
First, however, I should stress what this Article does not cover.  It 
does not cover (1) evaluations of policy interventions that were 
putatively aimed at “reducing gun violence” but that did not actually 
include any gun-specific elements, or (2) evaluations of interventions 
composed of multiple elements, some gun-related and others not, but 
that did not separately assess the gun-related elements.  One example 
of an intervention that does not involve any gun-oriented elements 
aside from the nature of offenders targeted are “Gun Court” 
programs, which establish special courts to handle gun crimes.  Aside 
from the fact that the programs are aimed at gun offenders, they 
typically have no specifically gun-oriented elements.26 
While some interventions involve genuinely gun-oriented elements, 
they are combined with non-gun-oriented elements in such a way that 
the effects of the different elements cannot be separately assessed.  
For example, Boston’s Operation Ceasefire involved two radically 
different strategies to reduce youth gun violence, one clearly gun-
 
 23. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 56–62; Don B. Kates et al., 
Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 
TENN. L. REV. 513, 513–22 (1995). 
 24. See Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun 
Trafficking and the Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 
1234–35 (2009). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See, e.g., Gun Courts, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/progtypesguncourt.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 
2012).  
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oriented and the other not.27  It not only attempted to disrupt illegal 
gun markets and reduce gun trafficking to gang members and other 
criminals, but also to reduce youth violence, in the same area, at the 
same time, by targeting street gang members with threats of severe 
punishment if they continued their violent ways.28  The developers of 
the program conceded that they could not convincingly separate the 
effects of the gun trafficking disruption efforts from the deterrence 
efforts, but nevertheless concluded that the dramatic short-term 
reductions in Boston’s youth gun homicide rate were almost certainly 
due to the deterrence components rather than the gun trafficking 
disruption efforts.29  They based this conclusion mainly on the 
grounds that no gun traffickers were convicted until after the youth 
gun homicide decreases already had occurred.30  In this light, to 
describe Operation Ceasefire as an example of successful gun control, 
or even a successful gun intervention, would be misleading at best, 
irresponsible at worst. 
To include evaluations of programs like these in this Article would 
effectively require review of every kind of crime-reduction effort ever 
undertaken, as long as its sponsors claimed that at least one of its 
goals was to “reduce gun violence.”  The reviewer would, for 
example, be placed in the absurd situation of reviewing studies of the 
impact of capital punishment on homicide merely because some 
sponsors of death penalty bills asserted that executions would deter 
gun homicides.31  Therefore, this Article covers only specifically gun-
oriented interventions, whose effects are supposed to be produced 
through some restriction on firearms. 
A. Lawsuits Against Gun Manufacturers, Distributors, and 
Dealers 
A variety of non-legislative efforts to reduce gun violence have 
been made.32  Beginning in 1989, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence, the nation’s leading gun control advocacy group, embarked 
 
 27. See Anthony A. Braga & Glenn L. Pierce, Disrupting Illegal Firearms 
Markets in Boston: The Effects of Operation Ceasefire on the Supply of New 
Handguns to Criminals, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 717, 722 (2005). 
 28. See id. at 723–24.  
 29. See id. at 743–44. 
 30. See id. at 723. 
 31. See Doug Mataconis, There’s No Evidence the Death Penalty Deters Crime, 
OUTSIDE BELTWAY (June 12, 2012), http://outsidethebeltway.com/theres-no-
evidence-the-death-penalty-deters-crime. 
 32. See, e.g., BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 15.  
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on a campaign to organize and assist lawsuits against gun 
manufacturers, distributors, and dealers on a variety of legal grounds, 
including negligent distribution or marketing, making and selling 
defective firearms, deceptive advertising, and contributing to a public 
nuisance.33  The Brady Center’s Legal Action Project assisted both 
governments and private parties in bringing suits by providing free 
legal assistance and expertise to plaintiffs.34  If these cases could be 
won on the merits, favorable decisions for plaintiffs might result in 
alterations in the way guns are manufactured, distributed, advertised, 
and sold.35  In extreme cases, these results could cause the bankruptcy 
of the firearms businesses due to damages awarded to plaintiffs or 
legal costs.36  Thus, gun availability, in general or among high-risk 
persons, might thereby be reduced by trial outcomes favorable to the 
plaintiffs.  On the other hand, cases that were settled out of court 
might benefit individual plaintiffs, but would be unlikely to alter the 
way the gun business operated.  Certainly cases that were dismissed 
or decided against plaintiffs at trial were not likely to produce such 
changes. 
Few of the lawsuits, however, were won on the merits or resulted in 
any changes in the gun industry’s operations.  Most cases were 
dismissed before reaching trial; in others, the plaintiffs dropped their 
claims; and still others resulted in favorable trial decisions for the gun 
industry.37  While private plaintiffs occasionally received out-of-court 
monetary settlements, these did not require any changes in the way 
gun makers, distributors, or retail dealers did business.38 
Lawsuits brought by state and municipal governments were 
uniformly unsuccessful in obtaining favorable court decisions.39  In 
 
 33. See About LAP, BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.bradycenter.org/legalaction/aboutlap (follow “The History of the Legal 
Action Project” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 34. See generally id.  
 35. See Fox Butterfield, Lawsuits Lead Gun Maker to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/24/us/lawsuits-lead-gun-
maker-to-file-for-bankruptcy.html. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE, supra note 15.   
 36. See Butterfield, supra note 35.  
 37. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 15. 
 38. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 15; 
Compendium of State Laws Governing Firearms 2010, NRA-ILA (July 9, 2010), 
http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/articles/2010/compendium-of-state-firearms-
laws.aspx.  
 39. Alan Feuer, U.S. Appeals Court Rejects City’s Suit to Curb Guns, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2008, at B2. 
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2008, the New York Times summarized the results of government 
lawsuits against gun manufacturers: “Gun makers have been sued 
dozens of times by city and state officials across the country, but no 
suit has ever been successful.”40  Most of these lawsuits have been 
dismissed, while a handful was settled out of court.41  As of 2005, none 
of the suits brought by municipal governments had been won by 
plaintiffs at trial.42  Since the gun industry rarely has lost lawsuits 
brought by either governments or private parties, there is no 
affirmative basis to believe that the suits had any impact on gun 
availability, and thus no basis to believe that they affected crime or 
violence. 
In 2005, most lawsuits promoted by the Legal Action Project were 
prohibited when the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 
was enacted.43  The law banned civil liability actions from being 
brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or 
importers of firearms or ammunition for damages resulting from the 
misuse of their products by others, unless the actions were permitted 
under a set of narrowly defined exceptions.44 
B. Behavioral Interventions to Reduce Firearms Injury 
Another broad means of reducing firearms-related injury by 
altering gun-related beliefs and practices has been attempted through 
“education” or mass media campaigns.45  These interventions 
commonly involve educational programs intended to increase 
perceptions of gun ownership, handling, and certain gun storage 
practices as dangerous, thereby discouraging these behaviors.46  For 
example, school-based educational programs aimed at children may 
teach them to not touch guns when not supervised by adults.47  In 
2004, a panel of the National Research Council reviewed “behavioral 
interventions targeted toward reducing firearms injury” and 
concluded, “of the more than 80 other programs described at least 
briefly in the literature, few have been adequately evaluated as to 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 15. 
 42. Dan Herbeck, America’s Gun War Is Being Fought in Our Nation’s Courts, 
BUFFALO NEWS, June 13, 2005, at A7. 
 43. See 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (2006). 
 44. See id. 
 45. COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, FIREARMS AND 
VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 201 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 202–05. 
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their effectiveness. Those that have been evaluated provide little 
empirical evidence that they have a positive impact on children’s 
knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs.”48 
Another variant of educational efforts aimed primarily at adults 
entails physicians counseling patients about the dangers of firearms.49  
Although supporters have claimed beneficial impacts of these efforts 
in the form of safer gun storage practices or reduced gun ownership 
based on crude before-and-after comparisons,50 the only randomized, 
controlled trial evaluation of this kind of program found that 
counseling had no impact on either gun ownership or gun storage 
practices.51  Another type of gun safety educational effort involves the 
use of mass communication methods, such as television and radio 
announcements, and widespread distribution of printed materials 
stressing the dangers of gun ownership or of storing guns in an unsafe 
manner.52  The most technically sound evaluation of such a program 
found that public education efforts in the form of safe storage 
campaigns had no impact on whether guns were stored unlocked or 
loaded.53  Finally, gun owners who participated in gun training 
programs were found to be no more likely than other gun owners to 
store their guns locked and unloaded.54  Whether this reflects the 
ineffectiveness of gun training programs is unclear because people 
who own guns for defensive purposes are the ones most likely to keep 
their guns loaded and unlocked, and most gun training programs 
would not instruct owners to store defensive guns locked and 
unloaded.55 
 
 48. Id. at 213. 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 202–03. 
 50. See, e.g., Kara S. McGee et al., Review of Evaluations of Educational 
Approaches to Promote Safe Storage of Firearms, 9 INJURY PREVENTION 108, 111 
(2003).  
 51. See David C. Grossman et al., Firearm Safety Counseling in Primary Care 
Pediatrics: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 106 PEDIATRICS 22, 24 (2000). 
 52. See Elanor A. Sidman et al., Evaluation of a Community-Based Handgun 
Safe-Storage Campaign, 115 PEDIATRICS 654, 655 (2005).  
 53. See id. at 658–59.  
 54. See Douglas S. Weil & David Hemenway, Loaded Guns in the Home: 
Analysis of a National Random Survey of Gun Owners, 267 JAMA 3033, 3036 
(1992). See generally PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS 
OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SURVEY ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 23, 
24–25 (1996). 
 55. See Jens Ludwig, Better Gun Enforcement, Less Crime, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 677, 685 (2005). 
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C. Firearms Safety Technology 
The National Research Council Panel on Firearms and Violence 
reviewed studies of the impact of firearms safety technology (mostly 
locking devices) and stated, “we found no credible scientific 
evidence . . . that demonstrates whether safety devices can effectively 
lower injury.”56  The Panel noted that many locking devices were 
found unreliable in unlocking when an authorized user of the gun 
wanted to use the gun,57 and that “firearms safety technology 
invariably reduces the effectiveness of the weapon.”58  The Panel also 
concluded that locking devices could “cause unintended injuries” 
because “locking devices may compromise the ability of authorized 
users to defend themselves” and “a lock may fail [to disengage] 
entirely or may take too much time for the weapon to be of use.”59  
Thus far, attempts to develop reliable “personalized” gun locks that 
automatically lock, but then unlock only for authorized users, have 
proven unsuccessful.60 
V.  EFFECTS OF GUN CONTROL LAWS ON CRIME 
The primary focus of this review is the effect of gun control laws on 
crime.  Enacting new gun control laws or amending existing laws to 
make them stricter could reduce violent crime by blocking the 
acquisition of guns, discouraging their possession in certain 
circumstances and locations, or deterring their use in crime.61  The 
laws might be broadly aimed at reducing gun availability in the 
general population as a whole, or just at subsets of the population 
regarded as being at a higher risk of committing violence.62  They can 
restrict firearms as a whole, or just narrow subsets like “assault 
weapons,” inexpensive concealable handguns, or handguns as a 
group.63  Conversely, gun control laws might be loosened, which could 
either increase or decrease crime.  This Article covers the more 
 
 56. See COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, supra note 
45, at 219.  
 57. Id. at 216. 
 58. Id. at 217. 
 59. Id. at 216. 
 60. COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, supra note 45, at 
216–17; Gary Kleck, Editorial, Guns Aren’t Ready to Be Smart, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2000, at A15. 
 61. See Gary KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 323-58 
(1991) [hereinafter KLECK, POINT BLANK] (discussing gun regulations).  
 62. See id. at 328. 
 63. For a taxonomy of gun control laws, see id. at 327. 
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important types of gun control laws; it does not cover minor types 
adopted by only one or two state or local jurisdictions. 
A. Bans on Possession of Specific Gun Types 
1. Local Handgun Bans 
The United States has never banned the private possession of all 
guns or of handguns.  Likewise, no state has done so.64  A few 
municipalities, however, have banned handguns.65  In recent decades, 
the only large cities to do so were Chicago and Washington, D.C., 
which effectively banned the private possession of handguns by first 
requiring handguns to be registered, then ceasing to register any more 
handguns.66  More precisely, these cities enacted slow-motion 
handgun bans in which residents who already had properly registered 
handguns could continue possessing them if they re-registered them, 
but no further registration of handguns would occur.67  Thus, as lawful 
handgun owners died or moved away from the city, the number of 
legal handgun owners would dwindle.68  Although these laws were 
struck down by the Heller and McDonald decisions, it is still worth 
assessing their impacts on crime as a way of judging the likely effects 
of adopting similar bans that might prove constitutionally acceptable 
to a future Supreme Court. 
The technically strongest evaluations of local handgun bans have 
assessed the D.C. law.69  Colin Loftin and his colleagues conducted a 
time series analysis of homicide trends in D.C. and in the surrounding 
suburbs, which were treated as control areas.70  They found that gun 
homicides declined abruptly in D.C. immediately after the law went 
into effect, and declined to a greater degree than in the D.C. suburbs, 
which were not subject to the handgun ban.71  This finding, however, 
 
 64. LEE KENNETT & JAMES LAVERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: 
ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA 244–45 (1975). 
 65. See Michael B. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v. 
Heller and Communities of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133, 145–46 (2009). 
 66. Chester L. Britt et al., A Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law: Some 
Cautionary Notes on the Use of Interrupted Time Series Designs for Policy Impact 
Assessment, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 361, 369 (1996).  
 67. See id. at 369, 371. 
 68. See id. at 369.  
 69. D.C. CODE § 6-2301 et seq. (1990).  
 70. See generally Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns 
on Homicide and Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1615 
(1991). 
 71. See id. at  1678.  
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was later found to be extremely fragile—it could not be replicated if 
the analysis was improved in any of a number of ways.72  Chester 
Britt, Gary Kleck, and David Bordua reanalyzed the D.C. homicide 
data and extended the dataset.73  The study found that support for a 
homicide-reducing impact disappeared once various improvements 
were made in the research.74  For example, the original study’s 
statistical model of the temporal pattern of the ban’s effect assumed 
an immediate, abrupt effect, even though the law implemented a 
slow-motion handgun ban that should have reduced handgun levels 
gradually over an extended period of time.75  When an impact model 
that more appropriately assumed a gradual impact was used, the 
results indicated the law had no effect.76  The authors also used the 
D.C. suburbs as a control area, even though control areas are 
customarily chosen to resemble the intervention area as closely as 
possible.77  The D.C. suburbs are radically different from D.C.  When 
Baltimore, an area far more similar to D.C. than the suburbs, was 
used as a control area, evidence of any impact of the ban on homicide 
disappeared.78  Baltimore experienced just as big a drop in gun 
homicide as D.C., even though the former did not ban handguns or 
otherwise strengthen its gun laws.79  Finally, since the impact of a 
slow-motion ban should be most pronounced after a few years have 
passed, the time period was extended to cover a longer period of time 
after the law was passed in 1976.80  Using this improved study, it was 
clear that by 1991 the appearance that the D.C. ban had an impact 
had disappeared.81  Thus, the most thorough analysis of the D.C. 
handgun ban indicated that it had no effect on homicide rates.82  No 
comparable studies of the Chicago handgun ban have been 
conducted.  In sum, it appears that local handgun bans do not reduce 
homicide. 
 
 72. See generally Britt et al., supra note 66. 
 73. See generally Britt et al., supra note 66.  
 74. See id. at 373–77. 
 75. See id. at 369-70. 
 76. See id. at 375-76. 
 77. See id. at 364-66. 
 78. See id. at 373.  
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 375.  
 81. See id. at 377. 
 82. See generally id.  
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2. Assault Weapon Bans 
The 1994 Federal Violent Crime Control Act banned assault 
weapons (AWs) and large-capacity ammunition magazines.83  Nine 
states have enacted similar bans.84  These assault weapon bans 
typically prohibit further manufacture, importation, acquisition, or 
transfer of specified models of semiautomatic firearms, while leaving 
ownership of existing AWs undisturbed.85  The impact of the laws are 
sharply restricted by the narrow scope of prohibited firearms and the 
rarity with which these guns are used in crime.  For example, the gun 
models banned by the federal AW ban claimed less than 1.4% of the 
crime guns recovered in two large statewide samples, while AWs in 
general account for less than 1.2% of the guns used in homicide and, 
on average, only about 1.8% of all the crime guns recovered by police 
in forty-three state and local samples.86  Because existing AW bans 
did not criminalize possession of AWs already in existence when the 
laws were enacted, and unbanned, mechanically identical guns could 
easily be substituted for the banned models, the maximum possible 
impact of the bans would necessarily be much smaller than 1.2 to 
1.8%.  For example, it was estimated that even under the most 
optimistic plausible set of assumptions, no more than 0.03% of 
prospective criminals could have been blocked from getting an AW 
or functional equivalent by the federal AW ban.87  We do not have 
research methods and data sensitive enough to detect effects this 
small.  For one thing, statistics on crime, even homicide, are not 
accurate to within 2% of the true totals, never mind 0.03%.88  
Consequently, claims that the federal AW ban reduced homicides by 
7% cannot be taken seriously.89  It is probably impossible to detect 
 
 83. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796. 
 84. See generally BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, 
STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES—FIREARMS (2010), available at 
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/platf-p-5300-5-2011/2009-30th-edition.pdf 
[hereinafter ATF STATE LAWS]; NRA-ILA, supra note 38.  
 85. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. 
 86. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 112–14, 141–43. 
 87. See Gary Kleck, Impossible Policy Evaluations and Impossible Conclusions: 
A Comment on Koper & Roth, 17 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 75, 77 (2001) 
[hereinafter Kleck, Comment on Koper & Roth]. 
 88. See id. at 78. 
 89. See Christopher S. Koper & Jeffrey A. Roth, The Impact of the 1994 Federal 
Assault Weapon Ban on Gun Violence Outcomes: An Assessment of Multiple 
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the extremely small effects that AW bans might have, if they have any 
effect at all. 
AWs do not fire significantly more rapidly than other 
semiautomatic guns or revolvers, and any one shot from an AW is 
not, on average, more lethal than a shot from other, non-AW 
firearms.90  Thus, the main reason that AWs might contribute to the 
number of deaths and injuries resulting from assaults is that they, like 
most semiautomatic firearms, all permit the use of large capacity 
magazines (LCMs), which allow a shooter to fire a large number of 
rounds without reloading.91  Bans on the further manufacture or sale 
of LCMs typically prohibit magazines with a capacity greater than ten 
rounds.92  Thus, if denied an LCM, a criminal armed with a 
semiautomatic pistol could fire no more than eleven rounds (the ten 
stored in the magazine, plus one in the chamber of the gun itself) 
without reloading.  The bans were based on the premise that some 
criminals armed with LCMs would kill or wound more victims 
because they could fire more shots without reloading.  The impact of 
these bans was sharply limited by the fact that very few criminal 
assaulters fire more than eleven rounds in a given violent incident 
even when they have the ability to do so.93  The firing of so many 
rounds is confined to a very small number of usually highly publicized 
mass shootings.94  Even in these incidents, however, LCMs are nearly 
always irrelevant to the number of rounds fired or the number of 
victims killed or wounded because most mass shooters are either 
armed with multiple guns and do not need LCMs to fire large 
numbers of rounds without reloading or are able to reload their guns 
because no victims or other parties tried to interfere with them doing 
so.95  In the decade preceding the enactment of the federal AW ban, 
there were fifteen mass shooting incidents in which more than six 
victims were killed or more than twelve were killed or non-fatally 
wounded in the entire United States.96  In all but one of these 
incidents, the killer either had multiple guns or reloaded during the 
 
Outcome Measures and Some Lessons for Policy Evaluation, 17 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 33, 59 (2001).  
 90. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 121–24. 
 91. See id. at 123–24. 
 92. See id. at 123. 
 93. See Koper & Roth, supra note 89, at 40.  
 94. See Kleck, Comment on Koper & Roth, supra note 87, at 79. 
 95. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 124–26, 144; Kleck, 
Comment on Koper & Roth, supra note 87, at 79. 
 96. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 124–26, 144. 
KLECK_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:47 PM 
2012] AFTER HELLER AND MCDONALD 1399 
incident.97  Thus, even in mass shooting incidents—the type of crime 
where the use of LCMs is supposed to be most consequential—LCMs 
do not affect the number of persons hurt.  Consequently, even an 
LCM ban that was so effective that it denied LCMs to all would-be 
mass shooters could not have any detectable impact on the number of 
victims killed or wounded in mass shootings. 
3. “Saturday Night Special” Bans 
These laws ban the possession, or more commonly the manufacture 
and sale, of small, inexpensive handguns, popularly known as 
“Saturday Night Specials” (SNSs).98  Unlike AWs, these weapons are 
a frequently used type of crime gun, and laws that denied access to 
SNSs could affect a large number of gun criminals.99  It is not clear, 
however, that the effects of doing so would be beneficial.  Surveys of 
prison inmates indicate that, among those who had committed crimes 
with guns before they were sent to prison, the vast majority would 
substitute some other type of gun if denied access to SNSs.100  Because 
jurisdictions with SNS bans do not ban all handguns or all guns, other 
types of guns theoretically still would be available for substitution.101  
The problem is that nearly all other common types of firearms are 
more lethal than SNSs.  Both long guns (rifles and shotguns) and non-
SNS handguns are more lethal in the sense that a shot from these 
other gun types is more likely to kill the victim than a shot from a 
SNS.102  SNSs are generally of smaller caliber and fire smaller 
projectiles at a lower muzzle velocity.103  The result is that SNSs inflict 
smaller wounds on victims than other gun types.104  As such, 
substitution of other gun types would generally increase the fatality 
rate arising from gunshot injuries—clearly an undesirable policy 
outcome.  Simulations of the substitution process, assuming different 
rates of substitution and substituted weapons of differing lethality, 
 
 97. Kleck, Comment on Koper & Roth, supra note 87, at 79. 
 98. See Gary Kleck, Evidence that “Saturday Night Specials” Not Very Important 
for Crime, 70 SOC. & SOC. RES. 303, 303 (1986) [hereinafter Kleck, Evidence].  
 99. See id. 
 100. JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED 
DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 216 (1986). 
 101. See generally ATF STATE LAWS, supra note 84. 
 102. See Gary Kleck, Handgun-Only Gun Control, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: 
ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 177-85 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1984) [hereinafter Kleck, 
Handgun-Only]. 
 103. See Kleck, Evidence, supra note 98, at 306. 
 104. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 134. 
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indicate that with even modest levels of substitution, SNS bans and 
handgun bans in general are likely to produce a net increase in 
homicides.105 
Empirical research, however, indicates that SNS bans neither 
reduce nor increase homicide.106  This may indicate that the bans did 
not deny SNSs to any significant number of prospective killers and 
the need for offenders to seek substitute weapons does not arise.  
Kleck and Patterson found no effect of SNS bans on rates of 
homicide, rape, aggravated assault, or robbery in America’s 170 
largest cities, controlling for other gun laws and a variety of other 
control variables.107 
B. Bans on Acquisition or Possession of Guns by High-Risk 
Subsets of the Population 
It is common for the states to prohibit the acquisition or possession 
of guns by relatively narrow “high-risk” subsets of the population.  
The categories of persons most commonly targeted are convicted 
criminals (often just those convicted of felonies), mentally ill persons, 
alcoholics (and persons under the influence of alcohol at the time of 
an attempt to acquire a gun), drug addicts (and persons under the 
influence at the time of an attempt to acquire a gun), and minors 
(usually defined as persons under the age of either twenty-one or 
eighteen).108  Other bans apply to persons of temporary statuses, such 
as a fugitive from justice or one subject to a restraining order 
protecting an intimate partner.109 
The most comprehensive assessment of these bans simultaneously 
assessed the effects of bans on gun possession by criminals, mentally 
ill persons, drug addicts, alcoholics, and minors, with respect to rates 
of homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, and rape.110  Kleck and 
Patterson found no significant crime-reducing effects resulting from 
any of these five types of bans on any of the four types of violent 
crime, with the possible exceptions of bans on gun possession by 
 
 105. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 91–94, 97. See generally Kleck, 
Hangun-Only, supra note 102.  
 106. See Kleck, Evidence, supra note 98, at 305–06. 
 107. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274. 
 108. See ATF STATE LAWS, supra note 84; see also NRA-ILA, supra note 38. 
 109. See sources cited supra note 108.  
 110. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274. 
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criminals on aggravated assault and robbery and a likely effect of 
bans on gun possession by mentally ill persons on homicide.111 
A recent study carefully assessed the impact on intimate partner 
homicides of five different types of domestic violence gun laws: 
restraining order laws forbidding purchase or possession of guns, 
restraining order laws forbidding possession only, laws forbidding 
purchase or possession of guns by persons convicted of domestic 
violence misdemeanors, laws forbidding only possession of guns by 
persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors, and laws 
permitting law enforcement officers to confiscate firearms at the 
scene of an alleged domestic violence incident.112  Of these five types 
of gun laws, only restraining order laws forbidding purchase or 
possession of guns showed evidence of impacting the number of 
intimate partner homicides.113 
C. Background Checks of Prospective Gun Buyers 
1. The Brady Act 
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (the Brady Act), 
which became effective on February 28, 1994, is the most significant 
piece of federal firearms control legislation passed since the Gun 
Control Act of 1968.114  The law’s central gun control mechanism is an 
instant background check on persons seeking to purchase guns of any 
kind, not just handguns, from Federal Firearms License holders 
(FFLs).115  It required FFLs to check with law enforcement authorities 
to see if the prospective buyer was disqualified under federal law 
from buying a gun, particularly if the buyer had previously been 
convicted of a felony.116  The law exempted the eighteen states that 
already had their own gun purchase background checks in place 
before 1994, and thus introduced new background checks into the 
 
 111. See id. 
 112. See Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws Restricting 
Access to Firearms by Domestic Violence Offenders Prevent Intimate Partner 
Homicide?, 30 EVALUATION REV. 313, 330 (2006). 
 113. See id.  
 114. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 
(1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22 (2006); see also JEFFREY D. 
MONROE, HOMICIDE AND GUN CONTROL: THE BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE 
PREVENTION ACT AND HOMICIDE RATES 1 (2008). 
 115. See 18 U.S.C. § 922.  
 116. See id. § 922(t). 
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remaining thirty-two states.117  It did not, however, impose 
background checks on prospective gun buyers seeking guns from 
private sources.118 
Jens Ludwig and Philip Cook evaluated the Brady Law and 
concluded that its implementation was not associated with a 
reduction in adult homicides.119  Gary Kleck and Thomas Marvell 
criticized the research for studying an unduly short period of time, 
1990–1997, which limited the ability to model pre-law trends or to 
detect anything but the very immediate effects of the law.120  They 
noted that, because the law restricted new acquisitions of guns but did 
not immediately disarm anyone, the law’s effect should be slight in 
the short run even if it was strong in the long run, when more would-
be criminal gun buyers were denied guns.121  The analysis was simply 
done too soon to assess the law’s impact properly, and it remains to 
be seen whether the Brady Law was effective.  The evaluation also 
failed to adequately control for confounding variables and wrongly 
assumed that the Brady Act could only affect killings of adults.122  
This assumption was based on the fact that the law did not change the 
legal status of gun purchases by minors (they were forbidden both 
before and after the Brady Act).  The assumption is wrong because 
roughly half of killings of juveniles are by adults, meaning that the 
implementation of the Brady Act’s new restrictions on adult 
acquisition of guns could have affected the number of killings of 
juveniles.123 
A second assessment also concluded that the Brady Law did not 
affect homicide rates.124  This study used different methods, but 
shared the most serious flaws of its predecessor—far too short a post-
law evaluation period (just three years) and inadequate controls for 
 
 117. See id. § 922(t)(3)(A). 
 118. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GUN CONTROL: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT 20 (1996). 
 119. Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with 
Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 588 
(2000). 
 120. See Gary Kleck & Thomas Marvell, Letter to the Editor, Impact of the Brady 
Act on Homicide and Suicide Rates, 284 JAMA 2718, 2718 (2000). 
 121. See id. at 2719.  
 122. See id. at 2718.  
 123. See id. 
 124. See MONROE, supra note 114, at 3. 
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confounding variables.125  Consequently, there is no sound foundation 
for judging whether the Brady Act was effective.  Firm conclusions 
will have to await research studying a longer post-1994 period and 
explicitly controlling for a significant number of other factors that 
affect homicide rates. 
2. State-Mandated Background Checks 
Before the Brady Act was implemented, many states had laws 
requiring background checks before gun sales, and some of those 
state laws still in effect are stricter than the federal law in some 
respects.  Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the effects of these state-
level measures.  Background checks or screening for disqualifying 
characteristics of prospective gun buyers are usually conducted in 
connection with gun owner licensing, purchase permit, or purchase 
application systems; therefore, one may gain insight into the impact of 
background checks by examining the impact of these kinds of laws.  
Kleck and Patterson found that gun owner licensing laws and 
purchase permit laws may reduce homicide, but do not affect rates of 
rape, robbery, or aggravated assault.126  These results suggest that 
background checks have value for preventing murders with guns.  
The apparent conflict between these findings concerning state-level 
background checks and Ludwig and Cook’s findings regarding the 
Brady Act,127 whose main gun control element was background 
screening of prospective gun buyers, may be attributable to a 
difference in the kinds of effects measured.  Kleck and Patterson 
assessed the long-term effects of state laws requiring background 
checks,128 while Ludwig and Cook could detect only the very short-
term effects of the Brady Act, which were unlikely to be significant. 
D. Gun Registration 
Gun registration is sometimes confused with other legal measures 
that commonly accompany it, such as licensing of gun owners, permits 
to purchase guns, or screening of prospective gun buyers for criminal 
records or other disqualifying traits.  Registration of guns, however, 
involves nothing more than officially recording the acquisition or 
 
 125. See Gary Kleck, Book Review, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV. 118, 118-19 (2010) 
(reviewing JEFFREY D. MONROE, HOMICIDE AND GUN CONTROL: THE BRADY 
HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT AND HOMICIDE RATES (2008)).  
 126. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274.  
 127. See Ludwig & Cook, supra note 119. 
 128. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 256. 
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ownership of firearms.129  It is precisely analogous to the registration 
of motor vehicles, which entails recording the owners of the vehicles 
but is not intended to block anyone from owning or driving a vehicle.  
Likewise, registration of firearms, as distinct from licensing gun 
owners or screening prospective gun buyers, merely involves 
generating a written record of the person who acquired or owns a 
gun, without blocking anyone from acquiring or owning a gun.130  
Most state gun registration laws require a record of handgun 
purchases be provided to some governmental agency, rather than 
requiring registration of all handgun owners.131 
The most common rationales that advocates offer for expecting 
some crime-reducing impact of gun registration are either that (1) 
registration will aid authorities in tracing the prior history of guns 
used in crimes and thereby help in eventually identifying gun 
traffickers and other unlawful sellers of guns, or (2) registration will 
deter criminal use of guns because prospective offenders will believe 
they could be identified through registration records.132  The latter 
rationale founders on the fact that criminals almost never use guns 
that are registered in their own names and rarely leave their guns 
behind at the scene of a violent crime for police to recover.133  
Therefore, advocates of gun registration more commonly stress the 
value of registration for aiding in the identification of criminal gun 
suppliers. 
The trafficking-focused rationale, however, hinges on an 
underlying theory of how criminals acquire guns, which emphasizes 
the significance of organized, high-volume gun traffickers.134  If such 
illicit dealers account for significant numbers of criminals acquiring 
guns, then any techniques that would facilitate identifying these 
traffickers could have substantial potential for reducing the number 
of criminals who become armed with guns, thereby reducing gun 
violence.  Some scholars have claimed support for this “concentrated 
trafficking model,” but the support largely relies on the 
misinterpretation of ATF gun tracing data and what it supposedly 
indicates about the involvement of “point sources” of illegal guns, i.e. 
 
 129. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 335–37. 
 130. See id.  
 131. See generally ATF STATE LAWS, supra note 84.  
 132. PETE SHIELDS, GUNS DON’T DIE—PEOPLE DO 150 (1981). 
 133. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 335–36. 
 134. See Kleck & Wang, supra note 24, at 1239–40. 
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higher-volume traffickers.135  The best available evidence indicates 
that high-volume traffickers are virtually non-existent and contribute 
only a negligible share of guns obtained by criminals.136  More 
commonly, the persons who illegally sell guns are residential burglars 
who sell the handful of guns they steal each year.137  Arresting and 
convicting such low-volume and easily replaceable sellers likely has 
little effect on the flow of guns to criminals.138  Therefore, using 
registration systems to identify largely non-existent high-volume gun 
traffickers or real but low-volume traffickers is largely irrelevant to 
the reduction of crime. 
E. One-Gun-a-Month Laws 
One other type of gun control law similarly relies on the 
concentrated gun trafficking model for its crime-reducing rationale.  
Based on ambiguous gun tracing data and law enforcement anecdotes 
about apprehended traffickers, gun control advocates and some 
scholars have claimed that a significant share of crime guns are 
diverted to criminals by traffickers who buy large numbers of guns 
(usually handguns) from licensed retail gun dealers.139  They are 
purchased either directly or, alternatively, indirectly through the use 
of straw purchasers (confederates of the trafficker who pose as 
genuine purchasers but actually buy guns on behalf of the 
trafficker).140  Supporters of this theory assert that many licensed 
dealers who sell the guns do so either knowing the transactions are 
suspicious or do so negligently, not caring whether the buyer might be 
a trafficker or straw purchaser.141  Thus, purchases of large numbers of 
handguns at a time from a corrupt or negligent licensed dealer are 
regarded as key mechanisms by which guns are diverted from legal 
channels to criminals.  Therefore, gun control advocates have pushed 
the enactment of laws that forbid selling more than one handgun to a 
given individual within a month on the assumption that this would 
significantly impair the efforts of traffickers to quickly acquire the 
large numbers of handguns they supposedly sell. 
 
 135. See id.  
 136. See id. at 1241.  
 137. See WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 100, at 197-99. 
 138. See Kleck & Wang, supra note 24, at 1238. 
 139. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 59, 76–79 (1995). 
 140. See id. at 79 
 141. See id. at 78. 
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As noted before, traffickers who sell large numbers of guns are 
extremely rare and do not contribute significantly to the flow of guns 
into criminals’ hands.142  For this reason alone, it is unlikely that one-
gun laws could reduce gun violence by any measurable degree.  It also 
turns out that most handguns purchased in “bunches”—i.e., as a part 
of a multiple handgun purchase (MHP)—are rarely later recovered 
by police in connection with crimes, and are actually less likely to be 
linked with later crimes than handguns purchased one at a time.143  
Koper used ATF gun trace data to identify handguns purchased as 
part of an MHP and to compute the share of the guns later recovered 
by police in connection with crimes.144  He found that even after ten 
years, only 4.07% of MHP handguns had been linked with crimes, 
and that this share was actually slightly lower than the 4.69% of non-
MHP handguns that were linked with crimes.145  As far as the 
available evidence can inform us, handguns purchased in multiples 
are rarely purchased by traffickers or straw purchasers, given that few 
crime guns are supplied by traffickers, and few MHP handguns ever 
end up being used in crimes.146  As a result, there is no sound 
empirical basis for the rationale that underlies one-gun laws.  The 
laws probably do no harm beyond inconveniencing the occasional 
lawful handgun buyer, but are also unlikely to have any measurable 
impact on crime rates.  This expectation was confirmed by a 
sophisticated, state-level, fixed-effects panel study of crime rates by 
John Lott and John Whitley,147 who controlled for other gun control 
laws and forty specific control variables,148 and found no significant 
crime-reducing effect from one-gun laws on any of the seven FBI 
Index crime rates.149 
 
 142. See Kleck & Wang, supra note 24, at 1241.  
 143. See Christopher S. Koper, Purchase of Multiple Firearms as a Risk Factor for 
Criminal Gun Use: Implications for Gun Policy and Enforcement, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 749, 760 (2005). 
 144. See id.  
 145. See id. at 760–61. 
 146. See id. at 762. 
 147. See generally John R. Lott, Jr. & John E. Whitley, Safe-Storage Gun Laws: 
Accidental Deaths, Suicides, and Crime, 44 J.L. & ECON 659 (2001).  
 148. See id. at 679–80. 
 149. See id. at 680. 
KLECK_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:47 PM 
2012] AFTER HELLER AND MCDONALD 1407 
F. Waiting Periods 
Some gun control laws try to delay gun acquisitions rather than 
blocking them altogether.150  Some require that gun buyers who paid 
for the gun and passed any required screening for disqualifying 
attributes wait a given minimum period of time before actually taking 
delivery of the gun.151  The waiting periods are usually two or three 
days, but can be as long as fourteen days in some states.152  Two 
rationales have been offered for waiting periods.  First, it was once 
argued that they served as “cooling off” periods, allowing prospective 
buyers in the grip of a violent fury to calm down before acquiring a 
gun.153  The plausibility of this rationale is undercut by the fact that 
criminal aggressors rarely acquire guns shortly before committing a 
violent act with the gun.154  Even where no waiting periods are in 
operation, violent offenders usually had their guns long before they 
used them to commit a violent crime.155  Further, among the violent 
gun offenders who get guns at the last minute, few acquire them from 
the licensed dealers who would observe the legally mandated waiting 
period.156  Another rationale for waiting periods is that they allow 
more time to carry out more thorough background checks.157  This 
makes little sense with regard to computerized record checks, since 
they can be carried out in minutes, but it is conceivable that states 
that still consult paper records might make use of this additional time.  
There is, however, no empirical evidence that more thorough, time-
consuming record checks are carried out in states with waiting 
periods.  Not surprisingly, empirical evaluations consistently indicate 
that waiting periods have no measurable effect on violent crime 
rates.158 
 
 150. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 323–32. 
 151. See ATF STATE LAWS, supra note 84, at 12–13. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 333–34 (noting that only three of 
342 incarcerated handgun killers in Florida had purchased the murder weapon from a 
retail dealer within three days of the killing). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 334–35. 
 157. See id.  
 158. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 283; Colin Loftin & 
David McDowall, The Deterrent Effects of the Florida Felony Firearm Law, 75 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 250, 255 (1984); Lott & Whitley, supra note 147, at 679. 
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G. Enhanced Penalties for Crimes Committed with Guns 
Some gun-oriented interventions do not involve restricting access 
to guns, but rather, attempt to discourage their use in crimes by 
establishing more severe punishment if offenses are committed with a 
gun.159  Firearms sentence enhancement (FSE) laws establish either 
mandatory minimum prison sentences for crimes committed with a 
gun or add on additional penalties for the gun use, above and beyond 
the penalties for the underlying offense, such as robbery or 
aggravated assault.160  The authors of a few technically primitive 
studies of a small number of non-randomly selected local areas have 
claimed to find an impact of FSE laws on crime,161 but the best 
available evidence indicates that they have no impact.162  The most 
comprehensive and sophisticated study was done by Thomas Marvell 
and Carlisle Moody, who analyzed every single state FSE measure in 
existence at the time of their research, using a multivariate fixed-
effects panel design to determine whether crime rates declined after 
FSE laws were implemented.163  They concluded that there is little 
evidence that the laws generally reduce crime.164  Indeed, they found 
that when crime rates changed significantly after implementation of 
FSE laws, they were slightly more likely to increase than to 
decrease.165  These findings confirmed the city-level cross-sectional 
findings of Kleck and Patterson,166 and more limited time series 
analyses of mandatory penalty laws in Michigan and Florida.167 
 
 159. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 337–42. See generally Thomas B. 
Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Impact of Enhanced Prison Terms for Felonies 
Committed With Guns, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 247 (1995).  
 160. See Marvell & Moody, supra note 159, at 250.  
 161. See, e.g., David McDowall et al., A Comparative Study of the Preventive 
Effects of Mandatory Sentencing Laws for Gun Crimes, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 378 (1992). 
 162. See generally Marvell & Moody, supra note 159. 
 163. See generally id. 
 164. See generally id.  
 165. See generally id.  
 166. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274. 
 167. See generally Colin Loftin et al., Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms 
Violence: Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control, 17.2 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 287 
(1983); Loftin & McDowall, supra note 158. 
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H. Child-Access Protection Laws: Requiring Guns to Be Stored 
Secured 
Child-Access Protection (CAP) laws require that gun owners keep 
their guns secured so that young persons (most commonly defined as 
those under fifteen or sixteen years of age) may not gain access to 
them and provide criminal penalties if harm is done by a young 
person with an unsecured gun.168  The laws are primarily aimed at 
reducing gun accidents, though they might also reduce other kinds of 
gun violence.  The most thorough and comprehensive study of the 
impact of CAP laws on gun accidents among young people was that 
of Daniel Webster and Marc Starnes, who assessed all fifteen CAP 
laws existing at the time169 using a state-level panel design that 
compared trends in fatal gun accidents in states that passed CAP laws 
with trends in states that did not.170  They found no significant effect 
of the laws in fourteen of the fifteen states; the only state that 
experienced a significant decline was Florida, the first state to pass a 
CAP law.171 
The authors interpreted this one decline as a genuine effect of the 
Florida CAP law, even though none of the fourteen other states with 
CAP laws experienced such an effect.172  They attributed this unique 
Florida effect to the fact that the law in that state provided for felony 
penalties for violations.173  This explanation founders for two reasons: 
first, the authors provided no evidence that felony penalties have ever 
actually been imposed for CAP law violations in Florida, and second, 
two other states’ CAP laws also provided felony penalties but did not 
experience declines in gun accidents among young people.174  A more 
plausible explanation of the Florida experience is that the effects 
were actually due to the extraordinary volume of news media 
coverage of the unique cluster of gun accidents that preceded and 
provoked passage of Florida’s CAP law, as well as the debate over 
 
 168. See generally Lott & Whitley, supra note 147; Daniel W. Webster & Marc 
Starnes, Reexamining the Association Between Child Access Prevention Gun Laws 
and Unintentional Shooting Deaths of Children, 106 PEDIATRICS 1466 (2000).  
 169. Only two more were subsequently enacted. See ATF STATE LAWS, supra note 
84; see also NRA State Laws, supra note 38; Right-to-Carry, infra note 180.  
 170. See generally Webster & Starnes, supra note 168. 
 171. See id. at 1467–68. 
 172. See id.  
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. 
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the law and the underlying issue of unsafe storage of guns.175  This 
intense burst of publicity served to highlight the dangers of unsafe 
gun storage and may have stimulated more gun owners to lock up 
their firearms, independent of the passage of the CAP law itself.  
Unfortunately, states that later followed Florida’s example could not 
expect to enjoy the same massive volume of news coverage that the 
first-in-the-nation CAP law received, so this publicity effect is not 
likely to be repeated.  CAP laws themselves appear to have no 
significant effect on gun accidents among young people. 
On the other hand, there is some evidence that CAP laws, by 
making guns harder to acquire immediately for defensive use by 
crime victims, increase crime rates.  Lott and Whitley found that the 
implementation of CAP laws was followed by significant increases in 
rates of rape, robbery, and burglary, with no compensating reductions 
in gun accident or suicide rates.176  This study, however, was subject to 
some of the same problems characterizing most of the panel studies 
that evaluated RTC laws, including the use of an unjustified, arbitrary 
selection of control variables, and no direct evidence of either 
changes among prospective offenders in perceived risk of confronting 
armed crime victims or of actual reductions in the accessibility of 
firearms.177 
I. Restrictions on Carrying Guns Away From Home 
Some gun laws restrict possession of firearms away from the 
possessor’s home, either prohibiting it altogether or requiring a 
special permit.178  Restrictions tend to be stricter when carrying guns 
on the person than when carrying in one’s vehicle and stricter for 
concealed carrying than for open carrying.179  The strictness levels 
used to be far more variable across states than they are now, since the 
post-1986 wave of “shall-issue” or “right-to-carry” laws were 
passed.180  Now at least forty states have these more lenient carry 
laws, which require a carry permit but allow most noncriminal adult 
 
 175. For a discussion of the limited effects of CAP laws, see Emmet Meara, Bill 
Before Legislature May Be Affected by Rampage, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22, 
1999, at A4. 
 176. See Lott & Whitley, supra note 147, at 679, 685. 
 177. See infra Part V.J. 
 178. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 326–27. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See Right-to-Carry 2012, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/fact-
sheets/2012/right-to-carry-2012.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) [hereinafter NRA-ILA, 
Right-to-Carry]. 
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residents to get one.181  A few states do not even require a permit 
(e.g., Arizona and Vermont), while other states require a permit that 
is rarely granted (restrictive licensing, e.g. California and New York), 
and Illinois forbids carrying altogether.182 
Cross-sectional research comparing cities in states with differing 
gun carrying laws found that banning carrying or having a restrictive 
permit law on concealed carrying, compared with those with 
permissive carry permit requirements or no permit requirement at all, 
had no effect on any violent crime rate, and that similar laws 
concerning open carrying likewise showed no measurable effect.183  
Longitudinal research, examining changes in crime after new carry 
laws were passed, could not be effectively applied in the pre-1986 
period because there were so few changes in the strictness of legal 
controls over carrying.184  Most states had restrictive carry laws 
throughout the 1968-1985 period.185  The opportunity to detect the 
impact of changes over time in carry law strictness arose after 1986, 
when stricter carry laws began to give way to permissive licensing or 
“shall issue” carry laws.186  Research on these changes is covered in 
the next section. 
J. Gun Decontrol: Right-to-Carry Laws 
Right-to-Carry (RTC) laws, also known as “shall issue” laws, can 
be seen as a form of gun decontrol in which controls over the carrying 
of firearms away from the carrier’s property are more lenient.  They 
typically involve changing state carry permit laws from discretionary 
“may issue” laws (restrictive licensing laws) to non-discretionary 
“shall issue” laws.187  Under the old discretionary carry permit 
systems, the burden of proof was on the applicant to show a special 
need or other special qualifications to have the permit, and the 
authority making this decision (often a county sheriff) had virtually 
 
 181. See id. 
 182. See NRA-ILA, supra note 38; see also NRA-ILA, Right-to-Carry, supra note 
180. 
 183. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274. 
 184. See id. at 252.  
 185. See generally Tomislav V. Kovandzic et al., The Impact of “Shall-Issue” 
Concealed Handgun Laws on Violent Crime Rates: Evidence from Panel Data for 
Large Urban Cities, 9 HOMICIDE STUD. 292 (2005); Marvell & Moody, supra note 
159. 
 186. See sources cited supra note 185.  
 187. See Kovandzic et al., supra note 185, at 292–93.  
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unlimited discretion in deciding whether to grant the permit.188  
Applicants without disqualifying attributes, such as a criminal 
conviction or being a juvenile, could nevertheless be turned down—
the authorized decision-maker “may” issue the permit, but is not 
required to do so.189  Permits were rarely issued.190  Under “shall 
issue” or RTC laws, authorities are required to grant the permit to 
applicants who meet specified requirements (e.g., adult age, resident 
of the state, no criminal convictions, completed gun safety course), 
and do not have the discretion of denying permits to otherwise 
qualified applicants.191 
By 2008, there were more than two dozen empirical evaluations of 
the effect of RTC laws on crime rates.  The results are about evenly 
divided between those that found crime-reducing effects and those 
that found no net effect.192  Only two studies have found crime-
increasing effects, neither published in a refereed journal, while ten 
refereed studies found crime-reducing effects and nine found no 
effect one way or the other.193  This simple count, however, does not 
tell the full story because nearly all of the studies finding crime-
reducing effects were based on county-level crime counts known to 
the police that were subject to serious missing-data problems.194  Most 
analysts used panel designs to examine trends in crime before and 
after RTC laws were enacted, as well as compared crime trends of 
counties in states that implemented RTC laws with counties in states 
that did not.195  Data from the Uniform Crime Reporting program are 
missing for at least some time periods for most American law 
enforcement agencies within the span of years examined in these 
studies, and most of the studies did nothing to account for this missing 
data.196  Thus, the data may seem to indicate that crime went down in 
a given county when the “decrease” was actually due to the fact that 
some of the constituent local jurisdictions in that county did not 
 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. at 316. 
 191. See id. at 292.  
 192. See id. at 311–15.  
 193. See Marvell & Moody, supra note 159, at 275–76. 
 194. Michael D. Maltz & Joseph Targonski, A Note on the Use of County-Level 
UCR Data, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 297, 297–98 (2002). 
 195. See id.  
 196. See id. at 316–17. 
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report their crime statistics to the UCR for part or all of that year—
especially if the non-reporting agencies were in high-crime areas.197 
This would not be a problem if non-reporting was unrelated to the 
passage of RTC laws, but it is possible that non-reporting is especially 
likely in RTC states immediately after enactment of the laws due to 
the avalanche of carry permit applications that are submitted in this 
period.  Local law enforcement agencies must perform fingerprinting 
of applicants, and this considerable drain on manpower may force 
undermanned agencies to sacrifice some lower-priority tasks, such as 
compiling crime statistics for the UCR program.198  The result would 
be the artificial appearance of crime drops occurring just after 
enactment of RTC laws and occurring only in RTC states—precisely 
the pattern of crime trends that has been interpreted as evidence of 
the crime-reducing effects of RTC laws.199 
The only high-quality study that is completely free of this missing 
data problem is the city-level panel study of Tomislav Kovandzic, 
Thomas Marvell, and Lynne Vieraitis.200  These authors studied the 
relevant crime data for each city that could be obtained from a single 
municipal police force for each year, and they studied only cities with 
complete data for all the years studied.201  Consequently, they did not 
have the missing-data problem of other studies that resulted from 
counting crimes for counties by summing crime counts for individual 
constituent law enforcement agencies in each county.  This study also 
featured an unusually well-chosen set of specific control variables to 
help separate the effect of RTC laws from other factors that influence 
crime rates,202 addressed possible problems of simultaneity (two-way 
causation),203 took account of clustering of multiple cities in states,204 
and used very sophisticated statistical estimation procedures.205  Based 
on their fixed-effects panel analysis of 189 U.S. cities with populations 
of 100,000 or larger over the period 1980–2000, the authors found “no 
 
 197. See id. at 299.  
 198. For an example of how extensive a gun permit application can be, see supra 
note 5.   
 199. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and 
Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 41, 1997).  
 200. See Kovandzic et al., supra note 185.  
 201. See id. at 301–02. 
 202. See id. at 305–07. 
 203. See id. at 300–01. 
 204. See id. at 302. 
 205. See id. at 303–04. 
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evidence that the laws reduce or increase rates of violent crime.”206  
This study also provides interested readers with a compact summary 
of the wide array of other methodological problems that afflict studies 
of the impact of RTC laws.207 
It is not surprising that research finds that liberalized issuance of 
carry permits does not have any measurable crime-increasing effect, 
given that carry permit holders virtually never commit violent gun 
crimes or do so in places that require carrying the gun on the person 
through public spaces.208  On the other hand, it is not especially 
surprising that the best available evidence indicates that RTC laws do 
not reduce crime.209  Supporters of the idea that such an effect occurs 
assume that the laws reduce crime because prospective criminal 
offenders are deterred by a greater perception of risk of confronting 
an armed victim, which supposedly results from either the enactment 
of RTC laws or the issuance of large numbers of carry permits to 
potential crime victims.210  There is, however, no direct evidence at all 
of changes in the perceived risk of confronting armed victims among 
likely offenders following enactment of RTC laws.  Further, the 
expectation of such changes is based on the assumption that the 
overall frequency of gun carrying by prospective crime victims 
actually increases when RTC laws go into effect.  Certainly the 
number of legally authorized gun carriers, i.e., carry permit holders, 
goes up, but whether the total number of gun-carriers, lawful or 
unlawful, increases is another matter entirely.  It is the latter number 
that is relevant to the risk of offenders confronting gun-carrying 
victims.  Those who get carry permits following implementation of an 
RTC may be merely legitimating gun carrying they were already 
doing before getting the permit. 
As it happens, the only direct evidence we have on this matter 
indicates that this is indeed what most carry permit holders are doing 
when they get their permits because, as a group, they generally do not 
increase their frequency of carrying after they get the permit.211  The 
National Opinion Research Center’s 2001 National Gun Policy 
 
 206. Id. at 292. 
 207. See id. at 298–302. 
 208. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 369–70. 
 209. See Kovandzic et al., supra note 185, at 292.  
 210. See generally Lott & Mustard, supra note 199.  
 211. See 2001 National Gun Policy Survey, May, 2001, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. 
OPINION RES., http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html (type 
into the search bar: “since you’ve obtained the permit”; then search by “Exact 
Phrase”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).  
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Survey, conducted in May of 2001, asked a sample of self-reported 
carry permit holders this question: “Since you’ve obtained the permit 
(to carry a handgun), has your frequency of gun carrying increased, 
decreased, or stayed the same?”212  Among carry permit holders, 73% 
did not change their frequency of gun carrying after getting the 
permit, and there was no significant difference between the percent 
that reported increasing their carrying frequency and the percent that 
reported decreasing their carry frequency.213  Consequently, there is 
no support for the assumption that total frequency of gun carrying 
increased or that prospective offenders faced an increased likelihood 
of confronting a gun-carrying victim following passage of RTC laws.  
Because there is no reason for offenders to perceive any increased 
risk of committing crime, it is not surprising that RTC laws do not 
appear to deter criminal attempts.  Note that this does not mean that 
gun carrying by prospective crime victims has no deterrent effect on 
prospective offenders; rather, it only means that whatever deterrent 
effect it may have had probably did not increase after RTC laws were 
implemented. 
K. Increased Enforcement of Carry Laws 
Increasing efforts to enforce existing laws, rather than enacting 
new ones, might intensify the impact of gun control on crime.  In 
principle, the enforcement of any gun control law could be increased, 
but research on the effects of boosting enforcement is largely limited 
to carry laws because these are the only types of gun laws that police 
actively enforce to any significant degree.214  Enforcement in this 
context means police arresting violators. 
There have been a few assessments of the impact of “directed (or 
targeted) patrol” by the police.  These efforts involve increased 
numbers of police officers being assigned to a patrol area, who are 
directed to focus their efforts on detecting and seizing illegal guns.215  
Few guns are actually seized, however, and virtually all of these are 
seized in connection with arrests for unlawful possession, which in 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. See also TOM W. SMITH, 2001 NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY OF THE 
NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER: RESEARCH FINDINGS 15 (2001), available at 
http://www.norc.org/PDFs/publications/SmithT_Nat_Gun_Policy_2001.pdf. 
 214. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 347–53. 
 215. See generally Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Reducing Firearms Violence 
Through Directed Police Patrol, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2001); Lawrence 
W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: “Hot 
Spots” Patrol in Kansas City, 12 JUST. Q. 673 (1995). 
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turn are mostly made in the public places where police patrol.216  
Thus, the studies really amount to assessments of increased police 
enforcement of carry laws. 
Although these programs are declared by their sponsors to be 
aimed at reducing gun violence,217 their primary element is simply a 
general increase in police manpower presence in targeted patrol 
areas.218  Evaluations of such efforts invariably fail to separate the 
effects of gun-oriented elements, such as seizing guns from suspects, 
from the effects of simply increasing the number of police officers 
patrolling in target areas.  For example, Lawrence Sherman and 
Dennis Rogan claimed that a “hot spots” intervention had reduced 
gun violence by police officers seizing illegal guns, but offered no 
evidence that this gun-related element was responsible for local 
deceases in gun violence rather than it resulting from increased 
overall police manpower.219  The researchers observed a 49% 
decrease in gun crimes in the targeted area.220  The explanation the 
authors offered for this huge drop is especially dubious in light of the 
fact that the investment of 4,512 additional police man-hours in 
directed patrol yielded a grand total of just twenty-nine seized guns in 
a large Kansas City neighborhood over a six month period.221 
Another directed patrol effort in Indianapolis had even more 
tenuous connections with gun enforcement because it consisted of 
patrol officers focusing primarily on traffic enforcement, and making 
more traffic stops.  As a by-product of the vehicle stops, however, 
officers seized twenty-five illegal guns for an investment of 4,900 
officer hours.222  Associated arrests for unlawful gun possession 
amounted to enforcement of gun carry laws.  The results of this 
program were considerably more mixed than those of the Kansas City 
program.  The number of gun crimes went down by 29% in one of the 
intervention areas but actually increased by 36% in the other 
intervention area (compared with an 8% increase in comparison 
beats).223 
 
 216. See sources cited supra note 215.  
 217. See Sherman & Rogan, supra note 215, at 676–77. 
 218. See McGarrell et al., supra note 215, at 123–24.  
 219. See Sherman & Rogan, supra note 215, at 690–91. 
 220. See id. at 673. 
 221. See id. at 680. 
 222. See McGarrell, supra note 215, at 131. 
 223. See id. at 137.  
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Pittsburgh’s Firearm Suppression Patrol (FSP) program was 
specifically directed at reducing illegal gun carrying, and consisted of 
more patrol being assigned to targeted areas, and increased traffic 
and pedestrian stops.224  Jacqueline Cohen and Jens Ludwig did not 
have measures of gun carrying per se, but instead evaluated the 
program’s impact on reports of shots fired and gunshot injuries 
treated in hospitals.225  Only seven guns were confiscated and only 
three persons possessing guns were arrested during FSPs,226 so it is 
debatable how much this program can be regarded as gun law 
enforcement.  For what it’s worth, the authors observed greater 
reductions in shots fired and gunshot injuries in target areas than in 
control areas.227  As with the evaluations of other directed patrol 
efforts, it is impossible to tell whether these reductions were due to 
any specifically gun-related efforts of police, or merely to increased 
police activity in general. 
Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia involved increased 
enforcement in another sense—more prosecutions of gun offenders 
and more severe sentences imposed on them (achieved by 
prosecuting under harsher federal statutes than under state 
statutes).228  Proponents claimed that the effort produced huge 
decreases in gun homicides, pointing to a 40% decline from 1997 to 
1998,229 but the most thorough analysis found that Richmond would 
have experienced an even larger proportional decrease in gun 
homicides if Project Exile had not been implemented.230 
On the whole, the weak body of evidence on enforcement of gun 
laws does not provide a firm basis for drawing conclusions about their 
impact.  On the other hand, the research does not indicate that 
increased enforcement has no effect, so this strategy remains a viable 
option for reducing gun violence.  And unlike so many other gun 
control measures, it has broad political support, so there are realistic 
prospects for the strategy to actually be implemented. 
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CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE 
Even though gun ownership levels in the general public have no 
apparent net effect on violence rates, gun ownership among high-risk 
subsets of the population may increase the frequency or seriousness 
of violent incidents.  This conclusion is directly supported by evidence 
that attacks committed with guns are more likely to result in the 
death of the victim,231 and indirectly supported by evidence that gun 
laws aimed at screening out high-risk groups (such as convicted 
criminals and mentally ill persons) from gun acquisition seem to 
reduce some kinds of violence.232  Gun owner license laws and 
purchase permit laws may reduce homicides and gun accidents, 
prohibitions of gun possession by convicted criminals appear to 
reduce aggravated assaults and robberies, and bans on possession by 
mentally ill persons may reduce homicides.233  This in turn suggests 
that improved background screening may reduce gun violence. 
One of the most obvious shortcomings of the Brady Act is that it 
does not cover transfers of guns among persons who are not licensed 
dealers.234  Most serious felons get their guns by means other than 
purchases from licensed dealers, and thus are not directly affected by 
an instant records check provision by itself.235  Since background 
checks on dealer transfers appear to be beneficial, extending them to 
cover private transfers of guns is a reasonable next step.236  There is 
nothing complicated about how this could work.  Private individuals 
who want to transfer their gun to a qualified recipient would still be 
able to do so, but would have to do so through a licensed dealer 
acting as a broker.  Prospective transferors would go to a licensed 
dealer with the prospective recipient, where the latter would fill out 
the usual application form and submit to the same records check that 
applies to dealer transfers.237  Criminals strongly motivated to evade 
the background checks could do so, but less strongly motivated 
prospective gun buyers, particularly those lacking connections with 
criminals willing to sell them firearms, could be blocked from 
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obtaining guns.  To expect 100 percent evasion is probably as 
unrealistic as it would be to expect no evasion. 
Bans on purchase and possession also could be extended to persons 
convicted of violent misdemeanors.  Currently bans of this sort only 
apply to domestic violence misdemeanants.238  Extending the 
prohibition to cover all violent misdemeanors makes sense because 
often the only reason a violent offender was convicted of a 
misdemeanor rather than a felony was because it was the product of a 
plea bargain, not because the offense was not a felony. 
Evidence indicates that laws prohibiting gun possession by 
mentally ill persons are effective.  While we have little reliable 
evidence on which to base forecasts, improvements in records on 
dangerous mentally ill persons could make screening for violence-
linked mental illness more effective and thereby prevent some gun 
violence by such persons.  Mental health databases should be made 
more comprehensive in coverage of persons found by a court to be 
dangerously mentally ill.  They also need to be made more accessible 
by those performing gun screening, which may require amending 
current medical privacy regulations. 
The carrying of guns by criminals in public places may increase 
robbery rates.  This conclusion is supported by evidence that indicates 
that robbers are more likely to complete their crimes if they are 
armed with a gun, suggesting that gun carrying can thereby encourage 
criminals to commit more robberies, especially impulsive or 
opportunistic ones.239  Evidence indicating that well-enforced laws 
forbidding unlicensed gun carrying may reduce robbery also 
indirectly supports this conclusion.240  Therefore, increased police 
enforcement of existing laws against unlicensed gun carrying may 
help reduce violent gun crimes that entail offender movement 
through public spaces, especially those that are not premeditated.  
Laws punishing unlicensed gun carrying with mandatory penalties 
may reduce robbery,241 even though the penalty provisions appear to 
have little impact on the actual levels of punishment inflicted on 
offenders.242  One possible explanation of this apparent paradox is 
that the mandatory penalty provisions may merely serve as an 
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indicator of serious commitment to enforcement among criminal 
justice personnel, and that it is actually greater police enforcement of 
carry laws that reduces robbery. 
Therefore, police departments might experiment with increasing 
street searches and arrests for unlawful carrying, and improving the 
targeting of searches by training officers in improved techniques for 
identifying pedestrians who are carrying concealed weapons.  Even in 
the absence of increased use of prison sentences for violators, 
increased carrying arrests might deter the casual, routine carrying of 
firearms, and thereby indirectly reduce unplanned opportunistic 
crimes, especially robberies.  Currently, most police departments 
show little evidence of a serious enforcement effort.  Most police 
rarely make arrests for any gun violations and confiscate few criminal 
guns.243  Thus, there is considerable room for improvement. 
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